An excerpt from Sir Chompsley’s work, on a curiously well documented, but otherwise minor skirmish early in what would come to be referred to, at least locally, as “The Greens War”. Note this is a later battle report, and thus refers to previous works of Chompsley, but is presented here first, as it is the introductory scenario for the new boxed set, and thus this seems the appropriate place.
[… Unusually, we have a wealth of documentation for the Ambush of West Road. Six separate primary sources [The Sheffield Collection’s 1199 Letters to the Sheriff of Shropshire from Baron Jasper de Crewe and Lord Richard of Boarsley, the Sheriff of Shropshire’s Letter to King Richard concerning the conflict, The Anonymous of Paris’s Voyages dans les Marches galloises XXIV Folio II paragraph 17, Brother William De Clair’s letter to the Bishop of Whittington, and finally Addaf o Affon Sych’s letter to his cousin Bleiddud from the Pershimham collection in Darby] that paint a full picture of the conflict. The November 1199 letters of Baron de Crewe and Lord Borsley detail to the sheriff of Shropshire a time of conflict with Welsh raiders aggressively despoiling their lands due to the battle of Five Pens a month earlier. Both lords report their frequent presence being called upon to patrol lands actively and garrison men in holdings normally free from conflict in the late season of the year due to the weather. Lord Boarsley’s letters describe his pursuit of ravaging bands of Welshmen back into the lands of Baron de Crewe. His speedy assaults destroyed hidden strongholds secreted amongst the people in de Crewe’s holdings. Baron de Crewe tells of his lands being ravaged by Lord Boarsely, who, under the guise of increased Welsh raiding, was actively depopulating lands the two lords contested. From the research, it can be safely determined that Baron de Crewe was informed of Lord Boarsley’s presence upon his lands, and regardless of who was actually burning holdings, Lord Boarsley was in the vicinity.
It is speculation if this was a personal matter, as Baron de Crewe was notoriously dismissive of challenges to his wealth from Lord Boarsley. Earlier letters detail that lord Boarsley and his actions were beneath his dignity to even acknowledge, let alone admit the man as being worthy as a rival.
At the battle of West Road, Baron de Crewe took a more pragmatic view and was looking to send a message about his lands being sacked and his having to fight in the November cold and rain. Baron de Crewe was extremely cunning in his efforts. His experience in the Holy Land fighting elusive enemies saw him enlist the retinues of Sir Edward Wollery and Sir Simon Payne, “Red Simon” to push from the North and South cutting off any raiders most common paths of moving at speed, in addition he recruited the Sheriff of Shropshire and a large force of posse comitatus that had joined the Sheriff to fight welsh in the region. The facts are clear that the amount of Welsh Raiding in the Eastern part of the county was exaggerated, and many English lords perpetrated the increased raiding during this time. In this particular case, the evidence strongly points to Lord Boarsley, as all raiding in the east abruptly stopped once the Sheriff of Shropshire and his forces began moving towards him from the East. King Richard was still upon the throne, and though presently fighting in France, most lords were not up to challenging his Sheriffs. Guilty or not, Lord Boarsley was in a position that saw him and his retinue upon the west road and running straight into the Ambush Baron de Crewe had set up.
De Crewe’s forces were mostly local. A levy of villagers seeking to protect their homes, a large group of archers formed from “The Best Archers in each local villiage. These were men who won’t back down.” as purported by The Anonymous, his retinue of loyal knights, and a small group of Sergeants who had formerly served in the Holy Land under the command of Red Simon and had been seconded to his service for this ambush upon his request. This was not the force he was accustomed to, but the need to garrison forces throughout his lands and to augment the strength of the Lords pushing the raiders left him with few options.
The Ambush was less of a surprise and more of an open assault as both forces arrived at Baron de Crewe’s ambush site almost at the same time. Baron de Crewe had his levy establish a barricade across the road, which was nearing completion when Boarsley’s forces arrived. Both lords sent their archers to use the hills overlooking the road to their best advantage, with de Crewe’s men moving to the top, and Boarsley’s taking cover behind the rocky protrusions.
Then the forces dashed straight up the road. Boarsley’s retinue raced towards the barricade, supported by his sergeants and the lord himself. de Crewe’s levy raced forward and secured the barricade that they then held defensively for most of the conflict. Boarsley’s Sergeants, perhaps unsure of their change in orders, split off from the main assault and began setting light to the peasant cottages off the road and then using the smoke to obscure a flanking advance. de Crewes’ archers began firing into the advancing levy, and soon the road was covered in fallen men. Despite the casualties, they screened Lord Boarsley’s advance and, rather than facing the spears of the opposing retinue, quickly jumped the wall to the South near the forest. At this same time, de Crewe’s sergeants, secreted in these same woods, charged into the unaware sergeants and with skilled work from hours of training and fighting in the east, their falchons dug deep into Lord Boarsley’s sergeants falling two and sending the remainder falling back in a route and fleeing the battle. Not sated with blood work, they returned to the forest and, finding the enemy levy unaware, fell upon them, killing them to a man. To the North, a deadly game of archery was taking place with the archers from both retinues sending volley after volley into armored targets and levy. Though no targets of this shooting fell or fell back, it soon became apparent that de Crewe’s archers were in much need of additional training as they regularly ignored commands to fire again rather seeking cover or an “ideal” firing position for their next volley. Lord Boarsley’s archers armed in mail advanced and made good use of the added protection, enduring several volleys of rival archers while actively receiving their lord’s orders and covering his advance.
Their presence was critical in weakening de Crewe’s numbers so that a gap was made that allowed Lord Boarsley and his retinue to race to the barricade, kill a number of the levy defending it, and force them back, leaving an opening for him to pass through. Baron de Crewe, seeing the gap, charged Lord Boarsley, and despite an aggressive melee, both sides suffered no casualties. The brutality of Lord Boarsley’s retinue pushed back Baron de Crewe, and the two sides separated. Now with room to maneuver, Lord Boarsley took advantage of the fading light and he and his retinue advanced into the darkness, leaving Baron de Crewe on the field of battle with the shattered forces of Lord Boarsley to be dealt with and presented to the Sheriff. Despite the many bodies presented, the Sheriff was not impressed, as he had been led to believe that he was aiding in the destruction of a Welsh raiding force. The deaths of so many Englishmen in what he viewed as a personal matter between lords saw him issue fines against both Baron de Crewe and Lord Boarsly for his costs in the campaign, and a strongly accusatory letter detailing the conflict was penned and sent to the king about the whole affair. It is without a doubt that had Lord Boarsley been slain or made to yield and held for ransom, the conflicts of the Welsh Marches in the Northern Moore region would have calmed for some months rather than renewed in the following weeks.
I am nothing if not a fair man, and in this regard must give Chompsley credit – when provided with a veritable avalanche of sources, he manages an accurate account of de Crewe’s attempted ambush on the West Road, free of his usual speculation and the fevered imaginings of the presence of the Templars who are now so mysteriously absent in the historic record.
Blessedly free of our usual task of attempting to correct the account itself, we find ourselves able to turn to the greater questions of consequence – for while a minor battle, the ambush, and de Crewe’s failure to bring his feud with Boarsley to an end at the tip of his sword, would have lasting consequences. Much blood might have been saved had Boarsley died that day – as he left so many of his retainers to do – or equally if the Sheriff of Shropshire had been possessed with a good measure more judgement. A village had been burned. Those who had done the burning had been captured, or cut down, and their bodies presented to the Sheriff. Chompsley notes the man’s reaction, which personally I can only conclude was the result of either rank corruption, incompetence, or a heady mixture of the two. That the raiders were inconveniently not Welsh but English does not forgive their actions, but it does highlight that the Sheriff was now facing the evidence of banditry in the area of his charge, perpetrated by an English noble. His attempt to sweep it under the rug and attribute the skirmish to a mere noble’s feud would, in a more peaceful era, been seen for what it was. It is sadly now only with the benefit of great hindsight that we can lay much of what follows at his feet.
Sadly, this was not a more peaceful time, and such feckless decision making under the guise of the “King’s Justice” was commonplace. It is indeed a testament to de Crewe’s exceptional character that, given the opportunity, he did not throw in with the rebellious Barons himself. But between the effect of the raids and the levied fines, we must conclude that, while de Crewe’s spirit likely remained resolute, his purse may have been feeling the effects of the campaign. It is thus that we can attribute his subsequent unleashing of Sir Simon Payne in his notorious campaign the following spring to this seemingly inconsequential skirmish.